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for gallantry occurred only in time of war. On account of poor efficiency ratings promotions could be delayed or suspended. An elaborate system of court martial, disciplinary and court of honor proceedings was provided for cases of criminal or immoral behavior to decide upon forced retirement with or without pension and with or without the right of keeping the rank. Officers on the active list, of whom the number of generals was generally around one hundred, were barred from political and business activities. Members of the armed forces including the police, commissioned and non-commissioned, were disenfranchised and had no right to belong to a political party. After 1944, however, membership in the Fascist Arrow Cross Party was no longer prohibited and after the war all the legal parties, Communist, Small Holders, etc., played a major role in selecting officers. Finally certain common historic struggles added to the cohesiveness of the old officer corps. A certain elite status was acquired by an officer's record in the counterrevolutionary movement in 1919 and his belonging to Horthy's National Army at that time.

It is obvious that the cohesive character of the regular Hungarian officer corps was one reason for the rapid elimination of these men by the Communists. The first Communist reaction was to replace them by men who had been thrown out of this tightly-knit group for reasons of their behavior or for reasons of discrimination. However, when the group of officers whom they brought in showed signs themselves of forming a tightly-knit corps, the Communists cracked down ruthlessly with a demonstration trial designed to make the lesson clear: no one but the Politburo may have ambitions for power.

C. The Final Period of Bolshevization

The elimination of the career officers and Ludovika graduates, even those who belonged to the Palffy clique, posed for the Hungarian Army the same dilemma as was posed in each of the satellite countries and for that matter in the Soviet Union too—how to obtain both professional skill and political loyalty. We have seen that the dilemma was solved in slightly different ways in the different countries. In Hungary, as in Romania, it was temporarily solved by bringing a group of politicians into the top posts, despite the fact that they had had relatively inadequate military experience. Among these there were indeed a sprinkling of career officers concentrated in the more technical positions and a sprinkling of converted Russian Army officers. From 1949 until 1953 the political horn of the dilemma was seized in preference to the professional one. That was the period during which the old Bolshevik Farkas was Minister of Defense. The army was reorganized with considerations of loyalty being put above considerations of efficiency. That is probably why the Hungarian Army is still relatively small and less heavily relied on by the Russians than the "friendly" Czech army or the well-con-

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trolled and Russified Polish force. The resolution of the central problem faced by the Russians was slower in the army of Hungary. Only with the appointment of the experienced Russian soldier, General Bata, as Minister of Defense has professionalism acquired appropriate standing.

On the whole Russia has had to cope with the lack of adequate professional officers in Hungary, as in Romania, by subordinating the satellite army very definitely to the Soviet forces on the spot. The power of the Soviet occupation is summarized in a document on Soviet Imperialism: Hungary 1944-48.[36] It was agreed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that each of the ex-enemy countries in Eastern Europe would be supervised by the three main allied powers acting jointly, and an allied Control Commission was set up. "The Allies agreed that the chairman of the Commission would be the Soviet representative . . . but the representatives of the three powers were to act jointly . . . From the very start the Soviet representatives consistently acted unilaterally in the name of the commission without consultation or notice to their British and American colleagues . . . Moreover the Soviet chairman ordered that all communications between the representatives of the western allies and the Hungarian authorities be channeled through him.

"The Soviet element used its military powers to further the cause of the Hungarian Communists in many ways. For example, it exercised censorship over all telegraph connections and permitted criticisms of the western allies in press and radio, but none of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet element seized virtually all of the newsprint in the country and Hungarian newspapers were able to obtain the paper only with the consent of the Red Army . . .

"Soviet influence was further strengthened by the presence of the Red Army in Hungary. Early in 1945 these troops numbered as high as one million and, despite protests from the western allies, were withdrawn very slowly . . . In the final treaty, negotiated in Paris during the winter of 1946-47, the USSR won the right to keep troops in Hungary." In 1951 at least four active Soviet divisions were estimated to be in Hungary and some estimates of Soviet troops there ran very much higher.[37]

That is why when Mihaly Farkas took over control of the Hungarian Army he needed only a modicum of military skill. That modicum he had. He had served in the Spanish Civil War and indeed had also had some military training in the Czechoslovak Army before that. After the Spanish Civil War he served in the Russian Army as an officer. He was, however, not regarded primarily as a military man and his first job after the war was as Undersecretary of Interior in charge of the organization of police. He was Deputy Secretary General of the Communist party and a member of the Politburo. In general his background and training, as that of all of the satellite Ministers of Defense whom we have studied except Rokossowski, was much